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TUITION AS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
David Gray Carlson* 
Bankruptcy trustees are suing universities because the insolvent parent 
of an adult student has written a tuition check while insolvent. The 
theory is that the university is the initial transferee of a fraudulent 
transfer that has provided benefit to the student but not to the parent 
debtor. This Article claims that the university is never the initial 
transferee of tuition dollars. Rather, the student is. Where the 
university has no knowledge of parent insolvency, the university can 
count educating the student as a good faith transfer for value, thus 
immunizing the university from liability. The unpleasant side effect is 
that the student is liable as the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer, 
and this liability is not dischargeable should the adult student seek 
refuge in bankruptcy.  
Fraudulent acts are as varied as fish in the sea.1 
Parents frequently cover the tuition expense of their adult children. 
Sometimes they do so when insolvent. 
Bankruptcy trustees have started to claim that the colleges and graduate 
schools that receive tuition from insolvent parents are fraudulent transferees in 
the parents’ bankruptcy proceeding.2 Tuition payments can be sizable—six-
figure numbers stretching over a few years, in some cases.3 
Until recently, the issue has been whether the school gives value directly to 
the parents when their adult children are elevated to the determination of 
thinking reason.4 Some courts have found that the insolvent parent receives a 
reasonably equivalent value. Accordingly, no fraudulent transfer occurs when 
the insolvent parent pays the tuition bill.5 Other courts have found no benefit to 
 
 * Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1 In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1583 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 2 See Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Trustees Claw Back College Tuition Paid for Filers’ Kids, WALL ST. J. 
(May 5, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-trustees-claw-back-college-tuition-paid-for-filers-
kids-1430869820. See generally Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking 
to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2158 (2019) (reporting on 152 
tuition cases, all but one instigated since 2006). 
 3 See, e.g., Pergament v. Hofstra Univ. (In re Adamo), 582 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, 
595 B.R. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (college sued for $121,388). 
 4 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 123 (A.V. Miller trans., 
Prometheus Books 1969) (1812) (“The determination of man is thinking reason”). 
 5 The leading case is Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013). 
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the parent.6 Accordingly, the schools must return tuition dollars to the parent’s 
bankruptcy trustee.  
Recently, the district court in Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School7 assumed 
that tuition payments by an insolvent parent are fraudulent transfers. But it 
outlined a legal fiction under which the school may or may not be liable to the 
bankruptcy trustee of the parent. According to this fiction, when a school takes 
tuition in advance of fall registration and promises a refund if the student does 
not register, the school is a “mere conduit” of the tuition and therefore not a 
transferee of the tuition dollars. Under this fiction, the adult child becomes the 
initial transferee of the tuition dollars, not the school. Later, when the school 
delivers an education, the school is a transferee of the student’s dollars. If the 
school in good faith later delivers the education, the school is a transferee of 
fraudulently transferred tuition dollars, but it avoids liability by virtue of the 
bona fide transfer defense in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1). Under § 550(b)(1), 
the bankruptcy trustee may not recover from “a transferee that takes for value, 
including satisfaction . . . of a present . . . debt, in good faith, and without 
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided . . . . ”8 
Weirdly, under the Brooklyn Law School reasoning, if tuition payments are 
overdue when the education commences, the school is the initial transferee of 
the tuition dollars. The § 550(b)(1) defense is not available to “initial 
transferees.”9 The university’s only defense is provided by § 548(c): a transferee 
of a transfer fraudulent under § 548(a) that “takes for value and in good 
faith . . . may retain any interest transferred . . . to the extent that such 
transferee . . . gave value to the debtor in exchange . . . .”10 As a result, the 
school can defend itself only by proving that it gave value directly to the 
insolvent parent. If the school gives value to the student but not to the parent, 
the school has received a fraudulent transfer and so must regurgitate tuition to 
the parent’s bankruptcy trustee. 
Under the Brooklyn Law School test, timing determines whether a school is 
the initial transferee of the student and thus the transferee of a transferee of the 
bankrupt parent (no liability), or whether the school is the initial transferee of 
 
 6 The leading case is DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 
2019). 
 7 Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019). 
 9 § 550. The defense applies only if the trustee proceeds under § 550(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) covers “any 
immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 
 10 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added). 
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the parent (strict liability).11 If payment precedes registration day, the school is 
safe. If payment occurs after registration day, the school must disgorge: 
Whether the schools exercise dominion and control over tuition 
payments immediately upon receipt thus depends on when each 
particular payment is made . . . . [I]n the case of any tuition paid early 
enough that the recipient school would have been obligated to refund 
it to the student if he or she then withdrew, the school must be 
classified as a mere conduit and the student an initial transferee, 
regardless of whether the student actually withdrew from school. But 
as for tuition paid so late that the student could never have had any 
right to obtain it, even had he or she withdrawn from school 
immediately, the school had dominion and control from the outset and 
thus is properly considered the initial transferee.12 
How could the district court in Brooklyn end up articulating such an absurd rule? 
The answer is that the court relied on Bonded Financial Services v. European 
American Bank,13 the leading case in tripartite fraudulent transfers cases. In such 
cases, a debtor (whom I shall call D) wishes to enrich a third party (X). D does 
so by sending funds to a creditor of X (CX) or vendor (V) of X. In the context of 
tuition, D is the parent, X is an adult child, and V is an institution of higher 
learning. If D is delinquent on tuition payments, the school is CX. 
In my view, the Bonded court missed a major point about tripartite fraudulent 
transfer cases. According to this missed point, subrogation and agency doctrines 
identify the child as the initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer in all cases.14 
The educational institution therefore either gives clear value to the parent 
(subrogation) or the parent gives the tuition to the child and subsequently, as 
agent of the child, pays the child’s tuition dollars to the child’s school. In such 
case, the school bestows value on the child (not the parent). If the school is in 
good faith—if the school has no knowledge that the parent is insolvent—the 
school has a good faith transferee defense that prevents school liability to the 
parent’s bankruptcy trustee.15 
This Article proposes that good faith schools are never liable for fraudulent 
transfers when they accept checks from an insolvent parent of an adult student. 
In pursuit of this proposition, Part I of this Article briefly states what a fraudulent 
 
 11 See Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 73 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019) (“timing is 
everything”). 
 12 Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 13 Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 14 David Gray Carlson, Mere Conduit, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 475 (2019). 
 15 See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019). 
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transfer is, and how a bankruptcy trustee of the parent is entitled to recover it 
from an initial transferee or transferee of a transferee. 
Part II describes tripartite fraudulent transfer cases, where an insolvent 
debtor conveys funds to a creditor or vendor of a person the debtor wishes to 
enrich. It is a bizarre and indefensible aspect of the Bankruptcy Code that a good 
faith initial transferee that bestows value on a third party is absolutely liable for 
the fraudulent transfer. A transferee of a transferee, however, is defended by 
such bestowal. The statutory wreckage, irrational and indefensible, can be 
rendered harmless through the doctrines of subrogation and agency. 
Part III reviews the “mere conduit” fiction employed in the Brooklyn Law 
School case and finds it analytically incorrect. Schools receive tuition from the 
student, even when the insolvent parent writes the tuition check. The school’s 
always the transferee of a transferee.  
Part IV warns that, if indeed tuition is a fraudulent transfer, and if schools 
are defended as good faith bestowers of value, then the adult student has received 
a fraudulent transfer by the very fact of being educated. Worse, if the adult 
student is driven into bankruptcy by the bankruptcy trustee of the parent, 
discharge of that obligation could be denied to the student under the recent case 
of Husky International Electronics v. Ritz.16 Even if this is not the case, receipt 
of a fraudulent transfer means that the student has received a “student loan,” as 
the Bankruptcy Code defines that term, and student loans are not dischargeable 
unless repayment constitutes an undue hardship on the student.17 Letting the 
university off the hook implies that the student received the fraudulent transfer, 
and for this liability there can be no bankruptcy discharge. 
I. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
It is my contention that, if the underlying property regime implied by 
fraudulent transfer law is carefully analyzed, schools would rarely be liable 
simply because a parent paid the tuition bill of an adult child. If the school has 
no knowledge of the parent’s insolvency, the school is a bona fide transferee for 
value and therefore has the defense against liability spelled out in Bankruptcy 
Code § 550(b)(1).18 
 
 16 Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (2016). 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019). 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 116–48. 
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Fraudulent transfer law emanates from state law, but the Bankruptcy Code 
also governs fraudulent transfers quite independently of state law. Furthermore, 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (enacted in most states) imports purely 
federal ideas (some of which are regrettable) back into state law. Thanks to the 
UFTA, serious errors of legislative judgment in the Bankruptcy Code are now 
present in state law. 
A. State Law 
In the classic fraudulent transfer, a debtor (D) makes an absolute transfer of 
property to a transferee (X) with the intent of preventing D’s creditors from 
getting it. According to the time-honored phrase in the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (UFTA), inherited from the Act of Elizabeth,19 D conveys to X with 
the “actual” intent to “delay, hinder or defraud creditors.”20 When this intent is 
present, it doesn’t matter whether D was solvent at the time of the conveyance 
or whether D received value in return. If D’s bad intent is present, D’s creditor 
(CD) may obtain a remedy with regard to the very property that D conveyed to 
X. Passing over the considerable controversy that exists with regard to fraudulent 
transfer remedies,21 it suffices to say that CD may obtain a judicial lien on the 
precise property that D has conveyed to X. At least this was how the matter stood 
in Elizabethan England. 
Fraudulent transfer law used to be a strictly in rem theory, with the proviso 
that if X breached her fiduciary duty to preserve the property for the creditors of 
D, X was guilty of the tort of conversion or breach of trust, which could generate 
a money judgment.22 The UFTA adds that CD is absolutely entitled to a money 
judgment “for the value of the asset transferred.”23 Thus, the UFTA, in stark 
contrast to its predecessor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), 
moves fraudulent transfer from an in rem concept to an in personam tort idea.24 
 
 19 See Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Gifts, etc. 1571, 13 Eliz. c. 5 (Eng.). 
 20 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 21 I cover these controversies in David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and 
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 165–95 (2003). 
 22 See Patrick J. Glackin, Note, Lease Terminations as Fraudulent Transfers: Reconciling Bankruptcy 
Code Section 548 and 365(c)(3), 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2368, 2372 (2018); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 222A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel 
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay 
the other the full value of the chattel.”). 
 23 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT § 8(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 24 This has led to the conclusion that the UFTA authorizes punitive damages against the transferor or the 
transferee. Klein v. Weidner, 729 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013); SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Judkins, No. 1:17-CV-
00413-TH-B 5666, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5666 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2019). DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables 
Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., 384 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2004) (issue certified to Indiana Supreme Court). 
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If D has fraudulently transferred to X, X holds the property received for the 
creditors of D. In addition, X has power to sell good title (free of CD) to a bona 
fide transferee for value. According to UFTA § 8(a), a transfer “is not voidable 
under Section 4(a)(1) against a person who took in good faith and for a 
reasonably equivalent value . . . .” The defense implies that, when D conveys to 
X with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud CD, X holds a voidable title to the 
property conveyed.25 One may say with accuracy that X holds the conveyance 
in trust for CD and the other creditors of D.26 
The preceding paragraphs describe the so-called actual fraudulent transfers. 
Long ago, the courts and legislators found the mental fact of intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud difficult to administer. D could usually spin a tale in which the 
conveyance was motivated by some incentive other than the desire to hinder 
creditors.27 Therefore, the UFCA of 1918 introduced the concept of the 
“constructive” fraudulent transfer. With regard to such transfers,28 it was no 
longer necessary for creditors of D to prove what D actually intended. If D was 
insolvent29 (or suffered some proxy for insolvency),30 and if D transferred 
property to X without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return, the 
conveyance was deemed to be a fraud on creditors.31 Basically, a constructive 
 
Classically this was unthinkable. 
 25 See Kenneth C. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act; or, the 2014 Amendments to the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS. LAW. 777, 819 (2015) (“the title received by the transferee in a 
transfer voidable under the UFTA is ordinarily voidable, and [UFTA §] 8(a) can be viewed as similarly wiping 
away that flaw in title if the property is taken by a good-faith purchaser for value.”). 
 26 E.g., Bill Voorhees Co. v. R & S Camper Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1979); First Natl. 
Bank v. Love, 167 So. 703, 705 (Ala. 1936); Buck v. Voreis, 89 Ind. 116, 117 (Ind. 1883). 
 27 See Jones v. Orton (In re Orton), Case No. 3:17-bk-1242-JAF, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 904, at *6 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2018) (gift of car to daughter not an actual fraud on creditors because debtors had a moral 
obligation to help their daughter). To combat these proof difficulties, courts long ago began to identify “badges 
of fraud.” See Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810–11. Eleven of these badges are codified in UNIF. 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 28 See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 423–34 (4th ed. 1997) (“a watershed 
in the evolution of fraudulent transfer law”). For the law on constructive fraudulent transfer prior to the UFCA, 
see generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1608–20 (2008); John C. McCoid III, Constructively Fraudulent 
Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 639, 652–56 (1983). 
 29 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 30 These proxies include: (i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which 
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) intended 
to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] 
ability to pay as they became due. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 31 See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Codifying a Choice of Law Rule for Fraudulent Transfer: A 
Memorandum to the Uniform Law Commission, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 357 (2011); Marie T. Reilly, 
A Search for Reason in “Reasonably Equivalent Value” After BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 13 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (2005). 
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fraudulent transfer is a “gift” by insolvent D to X. A constructive fraudulent 
transfer, however, may also be an actual fraudulent transfer, where D actually 
did intend to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The two concepts potentially 
overlap each other.32 
Since our subject is tuition paid by D to X’s school, we shall largely confine 
our discussion to constructive fraudulent transfers. We shall assume D is 
insolvent at the time D pays tuition to X’s school. We shall assume that D does 
not ordinarily intend to spite creditors by sending X to school. 
When the operative theory is constructive fraudulent transfer (or gift), D’s 
actual intent is supposedly33 irrelevant. Instead, the focus turns to whether D 
received a reasonably equivalent value. This is at least what the UFTA requires. 
According to UFTA § 3(a): 
Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer . . . , property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or 
satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor’s business to 
furnish support to the debtor or another person.34 
Notably, in the context of tuition, a school must show that it gave property (to 
somebody) or satisfied antecedent debt (of somebody). Is education property? 
The answer is decidedly yes. Education is a service delivered pursuant to a 
contract in exchange for a price. A student who complies with university rules 
has a property right to attend the university. Education is a “wasting asset.”35 
Like good deeds, education is devoured as fast as it is made, forgot soon as 
done.36 
 
 32 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1918) (“Every conveyance made . . . with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to 
hinder, delay, or defraud either present of future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.”). 
 33 See Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to 
Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1413–14, 
1424–25 (1994) (for the view that morality sneaks in through the doorway of reasonably equivalent value). See 
also Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 55, 
85 (1991) (“good faith in one variety or another is still very much alive in the reasonably equivalent value 
determination, not as proof of the prima facie case, but as a badge of fair value.”). 
 34 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 35 Drewes v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.), 939 F.2d 654, 655 n.2 (8th Cir. 
1991) (contracts for maintenance a “sort of wasting asset”). See Frank R. Kennedy, Reception of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 43 S.C. L. REV. 655, 661–62 (1992). 
 36 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 3, sc. 3 (“Those scraps are good deeds past; 
which are devour’d As fast as they are made, forgot as soon As done . . . .”). 
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The issue of whether services constitute value under the UFTA has bothered 
some scholars. In 1987, Professor Paul Shupack worried that the UFTA 
definition of value excluded the tendering of services:  
The question that the UFTA leaves unanswered is whether someone 
who supplies services to the debtor in exchange for an asset gives 
value. The drafters’ policy statement would suggest that, in the event 
the services provided had utility for the creditors as well as the debtor, 
the services should be recognized as value. The statute, however, 
provides a strong counter to that argument. The statute states that for 
value to be given, “property” must be transferred. If the list of 
examples in the statutory language is to be read as limiting the meaning 
of the word value, then the limitation implied by “property” applies to 
physical or intangible items that can be transferred from one person to 
another. The difficulty that the drafters have created here comes 
directly from their having offered examples and a policy statement 
instead of a definition for what is, after all, one of the central concepts 
underlying the law of fraudulent transfer.37 
If, however, we recognize that services are the proceeds of contract and that 
contracts proceeds are property, this concern disappears.38 I proffer this opinion 
in spite of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), which renders nondischargeable debts 
for: 
money, property, services, or an extension . . . of credit to the extent 
obtained by—(A) . . . actual fraud . . . .39 
Here, property is contrasted with services, as if they are two different things. But 
we should view services as the ghost of property past.40 
One way to put this point is that value is considered from the debtor’s 
standpoint, not the creditor’s.41 From the creditor’s point of view, anything a 
 
 37 Pal M. Shupack, Confusion in Policy and Language in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 
CARDOZO L. REV. 811, 833 (1987). 
 38 Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc. 487 S.W.3d 560, 575 (Tex. 2016) (“economic benefit to the debtor does 
not demand consideration that replaces the transferred property with money or something else tangible or 
leviable that can be sold to satisfy the debtor’s creditors’ claims”). 
 39 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2019) (emphasis added).  
 40 According to Derek Huish: “But courts have also held that forms of recreation and entertainment that 
are uncommon or wasteful, even gambling, can provide reasonably equivalent value to insolvent debtors. Most 
people would find it ridiculous that a court could find that an insolvent debtor received reasonably equivalent 
value through an investment in gambling but not through an investment in their own children’s education under 
the same statutory provision.” Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking 
to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2192 (2019).  
 41 Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy, Tithing, and the Pocket-Picking Paradigm of Free Exercise, 1996 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1041, 1051–52 (1996). 
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vendor V conveys to D which D immediately consumes (a vacation, say, or a 
restaurant meal) diminishes the debtor’s estate to the prejudice of D’s creditors. 
But from the debtor’s point of view, D receives value when V bestows a vacation 
or a meal on D.42 It is routinely found that V is not liable for fraudulent transfer 
if V in good faith sells immediately consumed goods or services to D.43 
Courts, however, sometimes insist upon the creditor’s point of view. In the 
leading case of Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,44 the Court allowed 
value conveyed to third parties to be counted as value to D, but “the decisions in 
fact turn on the statutory purpose of conserving the debtor’s estate for the benefit 
of creditors.”45 A service rendered to D by V often becomes a fraudulent transfer 
under this standard.46 
This controversy between the debtor’s perspective and the creditor’s 
perspective is a hugely important unresolved issue in fraudulent transfer 
doctrine. We shall assume, however, that the debtor’s point of view is the 
appropriate standard, and that D does indeed receive value when V bestows an 
instantly consumed asset (such as a service) on D. 
Since education bestowed is property of X, a school has clearly given value 
to X. But the Bankruptcy Code requires that value be given to D on the theory 
(to be challenged here) that D directly transfers tuition money to the school. 
According to § 548(c): 
a transferee . . . of such a [fraudulent] transfer . . . that takes for value 
and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
 
 42 Balabar-Strauss v. Sixty-Five Brokers (In re Churchill Mortg. Inv. Corp.), 256 B.R. 664, 681 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 43 Professor Zywicki also suggests that the debtor’s standpoint is justified because the transferee bestows 
the service on the debtor and has relied on the consideration received to compensate for the service. Todd J. 
Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Bankruptcy Debtor’s Right to Tithe, 
1998 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1243 (1998). Reliance interest as an alternative mode of describing the bona fide 
transferee defense is just another way of expressing the idea that value should be perceived from the debtor’s 
point of view. 
 44 Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 45 Id. at 992; see also Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The primary consideration 
in analyzing the exchange of value for any transfer is the degree to which the transferor’s net worth is 
preserved.”). 
 46 DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). Professor 
Kettering remarks: “Fraudulent transfer law balances the interests of the debtor’s creditors in avoiding a transfer 
against the interest of the debtor’s transferee, against whom the action lies and who bears the burden of 
disgorging the transferred property or its value if the action is successful. The interest of the debtor’s transferee 
surprisingly often has been forgotten in discourse on fraudulent transfer law, but to ignore that interest is an error 
that invalidates the discourse.” Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 350. 
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transferred . . . to the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the 
debtor in exchange for such transfer . . . .47 
The parallel idea in the UFTA is difficult to locate, but it is definitely there. That 
value must be given to the debtor is located in UFTA § 5(a): 
A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 
claim arose before the transfer was made . . . if the debtor made the 
transfer . . . without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer . . . and the debtor was insolvent at that time 
or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer . . . .48 
In this formulation, it is the debtor that must receive value in exchange for the 
transfer. If the debtor has not received value (but some third party has), the 
transferee is liable.49 
That the bona fide transferee defense depends on value being bestowed on 
the debtor (as opposed to a third party) is almost certainly the result of legislative 
error. The UFCA protected bona fide purchasers generally, regardless of who 
received the value. Thus, UFCA § 9 authorized avoidance “as against any person 
except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the 
time of the purchase . . . .”50 Nothing here requires that fair consideration be 
received by the debtor. Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 enacted the UFCA as 
the trustee’s own right to pursue fraudulent transfers, the Bankruptcy Act also 
did not require that value be received by the debtor.51 This requirement stems 
from Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) and was probably introduced unintentionally.52 
Nevertheless, it is now accepted that the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer 
has no defense even if the transferee in good faith bestowed value on a third 
party. This distinction makes vital the proper definition of “initial transferee.” 
 
 47 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added). 
 48 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 49 UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSFERS ACT § 8(b)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2014). 
 50 UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1918). 
 51 Nelson Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67(c)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 564 (1898) (generally dispersed throughout Title 
11). See Nat’l Bankr. Conf. Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (Comm. Print 1936) (“We have 
condensed the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, retaining its substance and, as far as 
possible, its language.”). The state of Washington has wisely corrected this error in its nonuniform amendment 
to the UFTA. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.40.081(1) (“whether or not [the value was] given to the debtor”). 
See Ralph Brubaker, On Constructively Fraudulent Transfers and Good Faith Transferees: The Case of a 
Debtor-Parent’s Payment of an Adult Child’s College Tuition, 39 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, 8 (May 2019) 
(discussing Washington’s amendment to the UFTA). 
 52 David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73, 86 (1985). 
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An important question, then, is whether a benefit to X (the student) is also a 
benefit to D (the parent). If D receives a reasonably equivalent value, then there 
is no fraudulent transfer. Both school and student escape the wrath of the 
bankruptcy courts. I shall soon problematize whether D transfers to the school 
or whether D transfers to X who (through the agency of D) transfers X’s to the 
school. I shall also point out that, if the school is a bona fide transferee of 
services to X, then education is X’s property, and the creditors of D can recover 
the value of this “property” from X.53 In short, it makes a difference whether the 
student X or the school is the initial transferee of the tuition money. If all value 
is received by X and none by D, then there is a fraudulent transfer and the 
controversy becomes who is the proper defendant—X or the school. For the 
moment, I observe that if D receives value from the school because X is 
educated, then there is no fraudulent transfer in the first place. Value to D serves 
to get both X and the school off the hook.54 If value is received by X alone and 
not by D, then it follows that one of the defendants (X or the school) is liable to 
the creditors of D. 
Before we consider whether education of X (D’s adult child) bestows value 
on D when D covers X’s tuition expenses, I review an analogous controversy 
from twenty years ago—whether church tithing is a fraudulent transfer. In the 
1990s, the vogue suddenly sprang up amongst bankruptcy trustees to recover 
church tithings. Mostly trustees won these cases. Courts failed to find the 
“economic” value bestowed by the church on D. In short, churchly benefit is not 
the same as services rendered pursuant to a contract.55 
Tithing cases differ structurally from tuition cases. Tithing cases are 
bipartite. In a tithing case, D gives a charitable contribution to X Church and the 
bankruptcy trustee brings suit against X Church. The issue was whether D 
received “property” from the church. This proved hard to find when the church 
was not contractually bound to do anything in exchange for the tithe. In contrast, 
tuition cases are tripartite. In a tuition case, D pays tuition to a school to make a 
gift to the adult child, X. Here, the inquiry is whether D received a reasonably 
equivalent value because a third party (X) was educated. 
 
 53 In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). See Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), 2010 
Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *18–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010). 
 54 Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R. 444, 454–55 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011). But see Lo 
v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1074–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (where D received value because X was educated, 
X still might be liable if X received a benefit from the education). 
 55 Zywicki, supra note 43, at 1233–44. 
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The tithing cases inspired Professor Jack Williams to suggest that implicit in 
constructive fraudulent transfer doctrine is the concept of honest “ordinary 
course” conduct.56 Thus, if a debtor customarily tithes, the creditors take this as 
the background reality of the debtor. Creditors cannot then obtain fraudulent 
transfer judgments against the churches, so long as tithing is in D’s ordinary 
course of business.57 Such a view recognizes that constructive fraudulent 
transfer law is an ancient proxy for specific intent to hinder creditors. That is, 
the purpose of ordinary course tithing is not to hinder creditors; therefore, there 
is no actual fraud and neither should there be constructive fraud, since 
constructive fraud is just a proxy for actual fraud. Thus, it is silently agreed that 
trustees should not seek to recover modest Christmas gifts to children, or tips in 
restaurants or taxicabs, because such giving is in the ordinary course.58 Such a 
notion, if tenable, would aid churches in tithing cases and schools in tuition 
cases. Admittedly, the notion cannot be squared with the definition of value or 
consideration, which is tied to receipt of property.59 
As churches began to lose tithing cases, Congress responded with the 
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998 to shield 
churches from fraudulent transfer liability. Such legislation confesses that 
tithing violated the tenets of constructive fraudulent transfer law.60 
As in the tithing cases, courts are quite divided over the “culturally and 
socially charged issue” of whether D obtains value when her adult child X gets 
educated.61 
There is no division, however, when X is a minor. In such cases, courts find 
not just a legal but a moral duty in D to pay the tuition bill. In Geltzer v. Xavarian 
 
 56 Williams, supra note 33, at 1414–16. 
 57 This is captured in Professor Glenn’s estimate that “the real test of a fraudulent conveyance . . . is the 
unjust diminution of the debtor’s estate.” 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 
§ 195 at 348 (rev. ed. 1940). See Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1993). Professor Williams’ 
vision can be found in the legislative cure to the tithing cases. According to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2)(A), a 
tithe cannot be an actual fraudulent transfer “if the transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in 
making charitable contributions.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (2019). On this legislative reform, see infra text 
accompanying notes 77–93. 
 58  But see Keating, supra note 41, at 1051–52 (“the drafters of fraudulent conveyance law have drawn 
the line at reasonably equivalent value received by (and from the perspective of) the debtor. This means that the 
insolvent debtor is still free to engage in most transactions, except those that amount to a gift by the debtor. 
Thus, though it may be small comfort to bankrupt tithers, a Mother’s Day gift given while insolvent is just as 
recoverable by the trustee as a tither’s donation to a church.”). 
 59 Zywicki, supra note 43, at 1244–56. 
 60 Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1962 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at *9–
10 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018). 
 61 In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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High School (In re Akanmu),62 the court ruled that the Ds received a direct 
benefit from tuition paid for their minor children. One benefit was that the Ds 
were obliged by New York law to educate their children, and actually doing so 
discharged this legal obligation.63 The fact that cheaper modes of education (i.e., 
public school) were available was “irrelevant.”64 The Akanmu court feared a 
slippery slope: if tuition could be recovered because it was too high and not 
strictly necessary, so could any vendor of goods used by the children.65 In sum, 
the Akanmu court found a confluence of interest between D and their minor 
children such that D and their children “must be viewed as a single economic 
unit for these purposes.”66 
When X is an adult, courts are divided as to whether D has received a 
reasonably equivalent value. 
Some courts have declared that D does receive a reasonably equivalent value 
when a school educates X. Most prominently, in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart 
University, Inc. (In re Palladino),67 the court acquitted a college of fraudulent 
transfer because the insolvent parent received value in return. It expressly found 
that if X was rendered financially self-sufficient by education, this was an 
economic benefit to D. 
Often a parent will not know at the time she pays a bill, whether for 
herself or for her child, if the medical procedure, the music lesson, or 
the college fee will turn out to have been “worth it.” But future 
outcome cannot be the standard for determining whether one receives 
reasonably equivalent value at the time of a payment. A parent can 
reasonably assume that paying for a child to obtain an undergraduate 
degree will enhance the financial well-being of the child which in turn 
will confer an economic benefit on the parent. This, it seems to me, 
 
 62 Geltzer v. Zavarian High Sch. (In re Akanmu), 502 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 63 Id. at 132; see N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3212(2)(d) (2005). 
 64 Geltzer, 502 B.R. at 132, 135. BAPCPA’s means testing is hard and stingy when it comes to tuition for 
minors. David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: Bankruptcy’s Failed Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 223, 298 (2007). But this attitude does not spill over to fraudulent transfer litigation. 
 65 Geltzer, 502 B.R. at 132 (“To hold otherwise would permit a trustee to scrutinize debtors’ expenditures 
for the children’s benefit, and seek to recover from the vendor if, in the trustee’s judgment, the expenditure was 
not reasonably necessary, or if the good or service could have been obtained at a lower price, or at no cost, 
elsewhere.”).  
 66 Id. at 136–37. The court goes overboard in accusing the trustee of wanting veto power over 
expenditures for the family. Id. at 132. For other cases finding no fraudulent transfer in case of tuition for minors; 
see McClarty v. University Liggett Sch. (In re Karolak), Case No. 12-61378, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3694, at *3–
9 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013); In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).  
 67 DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 556 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016), rev’d, 
942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). 
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constitutes a quid pro quo that is reasonable and reasonable 
equivalence is all that is required.68 
Channeling Professor Williams’s point, the court in Shearer v. Oberdick (In re 
Oberdick)69 found no fraudulent transfer: “there is something of a societal 
expectation that parents will assist with such expense if they are able to do so.”70 
A slight majority of courts, however, finds that the parent receives no value 
when an adult child is educated.71 Just before press time, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals, reversing in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart University, Inc., (In re 
Palladino),72 ruled that “the answer is straightforward. The tuition payments 
here depleted the estate and furnished nothing of direct value to the creditors 
who are the central concern of [§ 548(a)].”73 
In Gold v. Marquette University (In re Leonard),74 the school claimed D 
received peace of mind because X would have the opportunities in life that a 
 
 68 Id. at 15. In Palladino, D used Ponzi funds to pay tuition. Ponzi funds can be viewed as being held in 
constructive trust for the dupes and victims of the scheme. Thus, it is tempting to think that there were no 
fraudulent transfers in the case. Rather, the university simply received trust funds of some identifiable victim. 
But, as a bona fide purchaser of trust funds, the university took them free and clear of the rights of the victims 
and, in any case, the bankruptcy trustee has no right to enforce the beneficial interest of constructive trust on 
behalf of the victims. Id. at 14–15. On this issue, see David Gray Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers and Constructive 
Trusts: When Worlds Collide, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 365 (2020). The Palladino court also refused to use the Ponzi 
presumption that any payment made to further the scheme is an intentional (not constructive) fraudulent transfer. 
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 13–14.  
 69 Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013). 
 70 Id. at 712. See Lo v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). The Oberdick case is bizarre. It 
involves a deposit account with a bank that was held in tenancy by the entirety under Pennsylvania law. In 
Pennsylvania, the marital entity is considered a separate legal entity from either husband or wife. The theory of 
the case was that D (husband) deposited wages in the deposit account. Under Pennsylvania law, ninety percent 
of wages are exempt from garnishment. Nevertheless, 100% of the deposits were held to be fraudulent transfers 
from D to the marital entity. D and his spouse (W) made many prepetition withdrawals. This made D and W 
transferees of a transferee. D had a bankruptcy discharge, which should have terminated D’s liability for 
receiving and dissipating marital entity funds. The discharge was held not to apply on inscrutable reasoning. 
Then, out of nowhere, D and W were accorded a defense if the funds they received from the marital entity were 
used on necessities, as opposed to luxuries. Such a defense has no relation to any fraudulent transfer I am familiar 
with. It was in the context of the “necessities defense” the court made its observation about college education. 
Thus, rather than ruling that the parents received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for tuition, the court 
was really ruling that college education is not a luxury. Finally, the court identifies some luxury spending, but it 
allowed these amounts to be offset by “necessities” spending. Thus, D and W escaped liability altogether, even 
though they spent some prepetition dollars on luxuries. Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 698–714. “Necessities” may refer 
to the fact that wages are ninety percent exempt, except to the extent the wages are not necessary for upkeep. 
See generally Shearer v. Titus (In re Titus), 916 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2019).  
 71 Huish, supra note 2, at 2184; Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R. 444 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2011). 
 72 In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55. 
 73 Id. at *6–*7. 
 74 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444.  
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college education supposedly represents. Noting that the definition of value 
requires D to receive property or satisfaction of antecedent debt, the court 
allowed that receipt of value might be indirect—channeled from the school to X 
to D, like a bank shot in a game of pool.75 But the value D received must be “(1) 
an ‘economic’ benefit; (2) concrete; and (3) quantifiable.”76 Since D had no legal 
obligation to support X, D received no “value.” Peace of mind and moral 
obligation cut no ice.77 On the other hand, the court chastised the school for not 
even trying to quantify these values, leaving open the possibility that if 
quantification could be achieved, these indirect benefits might be value after 
all.78 
B. Legislative Reform 
The vogue of suing universities for tuition has been compared with the fad 
of suing churches for tithings in the 1990s.79 Mostly the churches lost. As a 
result, Congress enacted legislation to prevent suits in bankruptcy for 
constructive fraudulent transfers for charitable contributions for amounts not 
exceeding “15 percent of the gross annual income for the year in which the 
transfer of the contribution is made . . . .”80 For actual fraud cases, no law suits 
for amounts less than the same fifteen percent can be sustained “if the transfer 
was consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable 
contributions.”81 Meanwhile, § 544(b)(2) prevents the trustee from subrogating 
to the state law rights of a creditor against a charity tied to the same fifteen 
 
 75 See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1981) (“the 
transaction’s benefit to the debtor ‘need not be direct; it may come indirectly through benefit to a third 
person . . . . If the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in the debtor’s hands, or if the 
giving of the consideration to the third person otherwise confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then the 
debtor’s net worth has been preserved . . . .”). 
 76 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons., Inc. (In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x 
337, 342 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 77 See Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1962 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at 
*8–10 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018). See also In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); Boscarino 
v. Bd. of Trs. of Conn. State Univer. Sys. (In re Knight), Case No. 15-21646 (JJT) 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3324, at 
*11 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2017); Roach v. Skidmore Coll. (In re Dunston), 566 B.R. 624, 636–37 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. 2017). 
 78 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 459. But see Slobodian v. Pa. State Univ. (In re Fisher), 575 B.R. 640, 647 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2017) (trustee’s complaint survived Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because D had the burden to prove 
that D actually realized intangible value in exchange for tuition payments). The court deemed it necessary to 
find out if X has graduated and is gainfully employed. Thus, a bad choice of major might render the tuition 
payment a fraudulent transfer. 
 79 See supra text accompanying notes 55–60. 
 80 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (2019). 
 81 § 548(a)(2)(B).  
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percent limit.82 This section concludes with a remarkable sentence: “Any claim 
by any person to recover a transferred contribution described in the preceding 
sentence under Federal or State law in a Federal or State court shall be preempted 
by the commencement of the case.”83 Thus, a creditor might sue a church under 
state law, but if the debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditor’s suit is 
“preempted”—presumably it disappears.84 
Some have called for parallel legislation to protect universities from 
fraudulent transfer liability.85 Such calls confess that universities are indeed at 
risk, which the current article denies. 
At least one state (Connecticut) has enacted a non-uniform amendment to 
the UFTA. According to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i: 
A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision (2) of 
subsection (a) of section 52-552e or section 52-552f against an 
institution of higher education, as defined in 20 U.S.C. 1001, if the 
transfer was made or obligation incurred by a parent or guardian on 
behalf of a minor or adult child in furtherance of the child’s 
undergraduate education.86 
Conn. Gen. Stat §§ 52-552e(a)(2) and 52-552f refer to constructive fraudulent 
transfers. Thus, it is still possible to sue a school for receipt of an actual 
fraudulent transfer. The statute neglects to protect graduate institutions for 
tuition received. 
The Connecticut reform so far stands alone, and it raises choice of law 
predicaments in tuition cases. 
 
 82 See Kettering, UVTA, supra note 25, at 784. On state reforms, see id. at 785–90.  
 83 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(2) (2019). 
 84 For criticism of these amendments on technical grounds, see Steven Walt, Generosity in Bankruptcy: 
The New Place of Charitable Contributions in Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1029 (1999). 
 85 Alexis Gebhardt, Comment, Closing the Loophole: Bankruptcy Trustees Attempt to Claw Back Tuition 
Payments from Colleges and Universities, 3 BUS. & BANKR. L.J. 319, 339–46 (2016); Jenna C. MacDonald, 
Comment, Out of Reach: Protecting Parental Contributions to Higher Education from Clawback in Bankruptcy, 
34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 243, 245–46 (2017); Andrew Mackenzie, Note, The Tuition Claw Back Phenomenon: 
Reasonably Equivalent Value and Parental Tuition Payments, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 924, 949–52 (2016). 
Derek Huish presents a nuanced reform that would protect undergraduate institutions from liability when it 
receives a payment more than one year before the parents’ bankruptcy or (if “such transfer was consistent with 
the practices of the debtor”) more than six months before bankruptcy. Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back 
Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 
2151, 2198 (2019). 
 86 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i(f) (2017).  
CARLSONPROOFS_6.8.20 6/8/2020 11:45 AM 
2020] TUITION AS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 31 
Choice of law as applied to fraudulent transfers is an obscure topic that has, 
happily, been thoroughly reviewed by Professor Kenneth C. Kettering.87 
Professor Kettering reminds us that the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws 
favored the now-discredited “situs” test.88 Under this test, where the parent pays 
for tuition by check, the situs would be where the parent’s bank is located. A 
school will receive the check in the mail, will deposit the check at its local bank, 
which will send the check through a clearing system. Eventually, the parent’s 
bank honors the check, usually by crediting the account of the presenting bank, 
which eventually results in the school’s bank giving the school a right of 
withdrawal from the school’s deposit account. 
Since the First Restatement, a “revolution in American choice of law 
thinking” has swept away the situs test.89 The Second Restatement, considering 
real property cases, is mealy-mouthed about the situs test which “usually 
applies” but “on occasion” may not.90 It says nothing at all about personal 
property cases. As to real property cases, the Second Restatement points to the 
methodology appropriate to torts, which basically bids a court to find somehow 
which state has the most significant relationship with the occurrence of the tort. 
Finding such standards unsatisfactory, Professor Kettering suggests that the 
parent’s domicile should be the rule in constructive fraudulent transfer cases and 
also in actual fraud cases involving transfers for less than reasonably equivalent 
value.91 This rule, borrowed from Article 9 for hypothecations,92 has found its 
way into the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA),93 the latest version 
of a uniform fraudulent transfer law. The UVTA has been enacted in several 
states, but not yet in Connecticut. 
 
 87 Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 357.  
 88 Id. at 339 (“The First Restatement, issued in 1934, sets forth a simple sharp-edged rule: fraudulent 
transfer law is determined by the situs at the time of the challenged transfer.”). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 341 (discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CHOICE OF LAW § 145). 
 91 Id. at 357–58. His suggested rule thus lines up with the basic choice-of-law rule in Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1) (“while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, 
the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of a 
[possessory] security interest in that collateral”). Recall that Article 9 is basically fraudulent transfer legislation, 
legalizing hypothecations that otherwise would have been struck down by Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 
809, 810–11. See G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 3, 6–9 (2001). 
 92 U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a 
jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and 
the priority of a security interest in collateral”). In the case of pledges, the law where collateral is located is the 
choice of law. Id. § 9-301(3). 
 93 UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSFERS ACT § 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). See Kettering, supra note 25, at 
796–98. 
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If such a rule were to be applied,94 Connecticut’s statute would protect 
universities worldwide where the parent lives in Connecticut. On the other hand, 
Connecticut universities gain no succor where they accept tuition from non-
Connecticut parents. 
Such a choice-of-law rule indicates that Connecticut’s reform will have only 
spotty application, guaranteeing Connecticut schools protection only when the 
parent resides in Connecticut.95 This bleak assessment of the impact of state 
legislation, coupled with the well-known paralysis in the United States 
Congress, should motivate finding ways to protect schools from fraudulent 
transfer liability from within the resources of existing doctrine. I maintain that 
these resources are available. 
C. Federal Bankruptcy Law 
So far, we have treated the tuition question as a matter of state law. In fact, 
tuition litigation most often occurs within the context of bankruptcy litigation. 
Since the invention of bankruptcy, creditor representatives have been endowed 
with the power to collect fraudulent transfers made to third parties.96 
In modern times, a bankruptcy trustee has two different theories to recover 
a fraudulent transfer. First, the trustee has direct standing to recover fraudulent 
transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a). Second, under § 544(b), the trustee 
can assert the rights of an actual creditor who has avoidance rights under state 
law.97 The principal difference between the two provisions is the statute of 
limitations. Under § 548(a), a bankruptcy trustee has a two-year look-back 
period. Under § 544(b), where the trustee invokes the avoidance rights of some 
real-life creditor, the trustee is subject to a longer statute of limitations. Under 
the UFTA, the statute of limitations is four years.98 In New York, the statute of 
limitations is six years.99 
 
 94 Although Professor Kettering offers his proposal for legislative reform, he remarks: “There is little or 
nothing to prevent a court from following the approach to choice of law for fraudulent transfer set forth in this 
paper, if the court finds it sensible. Indeed, there are few subjects on which judges have been more receptive to 
suggestions from the academic community than choice of law.” Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31 at 359.  
 95 Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1964 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at *20–
27 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018) (declining to give Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i retroactive effect). 
 96 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 541 (1994); Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent 
Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 541–44 (1987). 
 97 In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 113 (2d Cir. 2016) (section 544(b) 
permits a trustee to “step into the shoes of a creditor under state law and avoid any transfers such a creditor could 
have avoided.”) (quoting Univ. Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 222 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 98 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 99 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (MCKINNEY 2019); In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 773 F.3d 411, 416 
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State law presents a trap for bankruptcy trustees. The UFCA and the UFTA 
distinguish between future and present creditors. If the trustee relies on 
insolvency of D (and not one of the insolvency proxies), the trustee must locate 
someone who was a “present” creditor at the time the tuition payment was 
made.100 Suppose D is bankrupt in 2019 and six years is the relevant statute of 
limitations. The bankruptcy trustee can recover two years of tuition under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B) without any reference to state law. But under state law, the trustee 
will have to locate someone who was a creditor in 2013 to capture tuition in the 
years 2013-16. If such a creditor cannot be located, the trustee can still recover 
if the trustee locates a creditor who was still a future creditor as of 2013. But this 
requires more than D’s insolvency. The trustee must also prove that, in the years 
2013-16, D: 
(i) [W]as engaged or was about to engage in a business or 
transaction for which remaining assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have 
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability 
to pay as they became due.101 
Thus, a creditor whose claim arose in 2018 might be invoked, but the burden of 
proof on the trustee extends beyond a showing of balance-sheet insolvency in 
2013.102 
The Bankruptcy Code supplements avoidance, as that concept is invoked in 
§ 548(a) and § 544(b). According to § 550(a): 
[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544 . . . [or] 
548 . . . the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the 
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such 
property, from— 
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose 
benefit such transfer was made; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial 
transferee.103 
 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
 100 See Alan N. Resnick, Finding the Shoes that Fit: How Derivative is the Trustee’s Power to Avoid 
Fraudulent Conveyances under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 205, 210 (2009). 
This distinction between present and future creditors in fraudulent transfer cases relates back to Reade v. 
Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (Kent, C.). 
 101 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). 
 102 Resnick, supra note 100, at 212. 
 103 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2019).  
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This section uses the word “recover,” which is undefined. I take this to be 
repeating the word “avoid,”104 as used in §§ 544(b) and 548(a). “Recover” adds 
nothing, if I am right.105 
Section 550(a) does add the idea of money judgments against X, “if the court 
so orders.” Such an idea is implicit in the idea of avoidance. If X (our fraudulent 
donee) sells the personal property received instead of holding in trust for D’s 
creditors, X is guilty of the tort of conversion. X has converted the property to 
her own use and must pay the value of the thing converted at the time of 
conversion.106 The reference in § 550(a) to money judgments reiterates this idea. 
Most of our difficulties stem from a distinction introduced by § 550(a)—a 
distinction between the initial transferee and a transferee of a transferee. In the 
context of fraudulent transfers, the only chance for an initial transferee to defend 
(putting aside the statute of limitations) is giving value to the debtor under 
§ 548(c). Where, however, the theory of avoidance is that an insolvent D made 
a gratuitous transfer, this defense will not avail the initial transferee. According 
to § 548(c): 
[A] transferee . . . of such a [fraudulent] transfer . . . that takes for 
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
transferred . . . to the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the 
debtor in exchange for such transfer . . . .107 
In our paradigm case, D pays tuition to a school for X’s education. Since X gets 
the value (education) and (ex hypothesi) D does not get value, the school has no 
defense under § 548(c). If a good faith university is deemed an initial transferee, 
the university is bereft of a defense.108 
A transferee of a transferee, however, has a different defense, as we have 
seen.109 According to § 550(b): 
 
 104 See Begier v. United States, 496 U.S. 53, 55 (1990) (“This case presents the question whether a trustee 
in bankruptcy may ‘avoid’ (i.e., recover) . . . payments . . . .”). 
 105 But see Suhar v. Burns (In re Burns), 322 F.3d 421, 425–29 (6th Cir. 2003). According to the Sixth 
Circuit, “recovery” is necessary when, at the time of D’s bankruptcy petition, D was out of possession. Thus, 
recovery is redundant of the turnover provision. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2019). In my view, recovery is redundant 
of avoidance itself. 
 106 “Conversion” is a personal property concept. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1965) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously 
interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full 
value of the chattel.”). Courts are quite willing to issue money judgments for the fraudulent transfer of real 
property as well. James v. Powell, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24–25 (N.Y. 1967). 
 107 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added). 
 108 Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019). 
 109 See supra text accompanying notes 6–7. 
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The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section 
from—(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or 
securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without 
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided . . . .110 
By the reference to § 550(a)(2), § 550(b) indicates that initial transferees may 
not assert this defense.111 This defense differs from that to be found in § 548(c). 
Whereas § 548(c) requires good faith value to the debtor, § 550(b) permits good 
faith value to nondebtors. 
As a result, in the case of gratuitous transfers, it matters a great deal whether 
we proclaim the defendant to be the initial transferee or the transferee of a 
transferee. If the school is an initial transferee who has in good faith given value 
to X, such value cannot defend the school. But if the school is the transferee of 
a transferee, good faith value extended to X (education) has defensive bite on 
behalf of the school. 
Section 550(a)(1) gives the trustee the additional option of recovering from 
the “entity for whose benefit” the initial transfer was made.112 This concept, 
however, is not relevant in tuition cases. X is clearly benefited when D pays the 
tuition bill, but X also receives the proceeds of the tuition. X is therefore a 
transferee of a transferee (if the school is conceived as the initial transferee of 
tuition dollars). The seminal case on tripartite fraudulent transfers, Bonded 
Financial Services v. European American Bank,113 holds that a transferee of a 
transferee under § 550(a)(2) can never be a “person benefited” under 
§ 550(a)(1).114 A transferee of a transferee is entitled to the bona fide transfer 
defense under § 550(b)(1) and a “person benefited” under § 550(a)(1) is not. 
Judge Easterbrook, in Bonded, reasoned a transferee of a transferee ought not to 
be deprived of the bona fide transfer defense by recharacterizing the remote 
transferee as a person benefited by the initial transfer.115 Accordingly, either X 
is the initial transferee or X is the transferee of a transferee, but X is never a 
person benefitted when D pays X’s tuition bill. Bizarrely, the law implies that 
 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2019).  
 111 Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Servs. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2002); Shafer v. 
Las Vegas Hilton Corp. (In re Video Depot), 127 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1997); Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 
936, 938, 944 (10th Cir. 1996); Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway (In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship), 99 F.3d 
151, 154 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 112  Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14, at 525–26 (analyzing the meaning of “benefit”). 
 113  Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 114 Id. at 896.  
 115 Id.  
CARLSONPROOFS_6.8.20 6/8/2020 11:45 AM 
36 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
education never “benefits” X. It is only transferred to X in a billiards-style bank 
shot. 
II. TRIPARTITE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
A great many fraudulent transfer cases are tripartite. In these cases, insolvent 
D pays CX, a creditor of X, where X is a friend, relative or insider of D. Because 
D’s check is made payable to CX, courts wrongly perceive CX as the initial 
transferee of a fraudulent transfer made for the benefit of X.116 As the initial 
transferee, CX’s only chance to defend is that CX in good faith conveyed value to 
D (rather than to X). Courts usually think this cannot be shown. 
CX, however, can easily show that D’s check to CX bestowed value upon X. 
If X were the initial transferee and if CX were X’s transferee, CX would be a 
transferee of a transferee under § 550(a)(2). Such a transfer once removed from 
D is entitled to the defense of § 550(b)(1). That defense requires CX to be a good 
faith transferee, and it expressly includes “tak[ing] for value, including 
satisfaction or securing of a present of antecedent debt . . . .”117 It does not 
require that the value be given to D, as § 548(c) does. 
A. Subrogation 
Courts assume that when D writes a check to CX, CX is the initial transferee 
of a fraudulent transfer. What courts forget is that when D sends funds to CX, D 
is subrogated to CX’s rights against X. Where X is solvent, this subrogation right 
is a dollar-for-dollar equivalent exchange.118 Accordingly, D receives value 
within the meaning of § 548(c).119 
The mechanics of subrogation is most easily seen if we translate the matter 
to the environment of negotiable instruments. Suppose X has borrowed $100 
from CX and has signed a promissory note for this debt. At the time of the loan 
assume X is solvent. D then pays CX $100 for the note and CX surrenders the note 
 
 116 Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. 
 117 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019). 
 118 In re Ollag Construction Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 908–09 (2d Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Comm’r, 560 
F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1977); Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial 
Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 679 (1983); Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and 
Downstream) Guaranties under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 699–700 (1987); 
Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.109, 113 (1986); 
William H. Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary 
Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. R 433, 456–57 (1980).  
 119 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984), 7A U.L.A. 644, 645 
(1985) (stating that the debtor assets include the “contingent claim of a surety for . . . subrogation”). 
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to D. Assume at the time of this exchange, D is insolvent. It is erroneous to think 
that CX has been paid and that X is now debt-free. Rather, D has bought the 
promissory note and may now enforce the note against X. This is precisely how 
subrogation works. 
Because of subrogation, CX has made a contemporaneous exchange with D. 
D paid $100 to CX and in exchange has received rights against X. Since X is 
solvent and can pay, D has received full value from CX. The exchange is not a 
fraudulent transfer. 
Suppose further that, later, D realizes that if D recovers from X, the proceeds 
will only enrich D’s creditors. Therefore, in an effort to enrich X, D rips up the 
note, waives her rights and renders X debt-free. Forgiveness of debt is a 
transfer120 and, if X gave nothing in return for debt forgiveness, forgiveness is a 
fraudulent transfer. Accordingly, D’s bankruptcy trustee can recover $100 from 
X, who is the initial transferee of the debt cancellation. The trustee can recover 
nothing from CX. 
Typically, a school, like any rational vendor, wants tuition payments up 
front, before the education of X actually commences.121 The school is typically 
not a creditor of X. But subrogation can (uneasily) be made to fit the tuition 
puzzle. In the subrogation model, D (the parent) buys the education. Then the 
parent doles out the education to the child. Every time X obtains a unit of 
education from the school, D is surrendering an asset to X without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in return. In this vision, D owns the education and 
doles it out to X. 
There are several things wrong with the subrogation picture as applied to 
tuition cases. First, D does not deliver lectures to X, nor does D grade X’s papers 
or bestow a diploma on X. The school does all these things—though it arguably 
does so as agent of D. 
A second possible objection is that the school admitted the child, not the 
parent. If the parent shows up at school and demands to be educated, the school 
is within its rights to call security to have the parent escorted off campus, 
because the admission was granted to the adult child alone. 
 
 120 Grochocinsky v. Reliant Interactive Media Corp. (In re General Search.com), 322 B.R. 836, 842–43 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co., 37 Cal. App. 5th 894, 904–05 (Cal. App. 2019); cf. 
Patrick J. Glackin, Note, Lease Terminations as Fraudulent Transfers: Reconciling Bankruptcy Code Section 
548 and 365(c)(3), 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2368, 2386–89 (2018) (lease cancellations are transfers). 
 121 Pergament v. Hofstra Univ. (In re Adamo), 582 B.R. 267, 269–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, 
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (college sued for $121,388). 
CARLSONPROOFS_6.8.20 6/8/2020 11:45 AM 
38 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
A third observation suggests subrogation is the wrong concept. Suppose the 
parent D and the child X have a falling out. D then forbids X from attending 
school out of spite. The school will undoubtedly conclude that X has bought the 
education because the tuition bill was paid. Most schools, I think, educate X over 
the opposition of D (where X is an adult).122 
A fourth objection is that subrogation creates reasonably equivalent value 
for D when X is solvent. But where X is insolvent, the value of D’s asset must 
be discounted. College students are usually insolvent. Therefore, the school does 
not give full value when it sells X’s education to the parent D. Subrogation will 
usually yield only a partial defense to a university. 
These observations militate against applying the subrogation model. 
Although subrogation describes transfers to CX (creditor of X), the concept ill 
fits the tuition cases. 
B. Agency 
There is an alternative way to analyze simple tripartite cases where CX is the 
creditor of X and D wishes to enrich X by retiring CX’s claim against X. The 
extinguishment of CX’s claim requires that X tender payment to CX. Under our 
scenario, D tenders D’s own dollars to X. According to the law of payment, D’s 
tender means precisely what D intends it to mean.123 D’s intent is that the dollars 
are to extinguish X’s claim. CX cannot accept D’s dollars for any other purpose. 
CX cannot say, “I treat this as a gift from D to me personally,” while maintaining, 
on the side, “I shall bring an action against X to compel X to pay X’s debt, since 
that debt is outstanding.” The meaning of D’s tender is that X’s debt is 
extinguished. CX is stuck with that meaning.124 
Being a creditor means that CX is required to accept tender of money from X 
to extinguish the debt. A corollary is that CX is not required to accept money 
from a stranger to pay (or buy) X’s debt. CX can refuse D’s tender and insist that 
X pay CX. D, however, can claim to be the agent of X and can claim that D’s 
dollars are actually X’s dollars. In that case, if D really is the agent of X, CX is 
obligated to accept D’s tender, because D is tendering X’s dollars. And if X 
agrees that CX’s claim against X is extinguished, X must have ratified D’s acts 
as being authorized. This necessarily entails that D first gave dollars to X as 
initial transferee. Only thereafter did X (through the agency of D) tender dollars 
 
 122 In re Adamo, 582 B.R. at 275. 
 123 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 388–89 (Walter H.E. Yaeger ed., 3rd. 
ed. 1972). 
 124 Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Assocs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
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to CX. This makes CX a transferee of a transferee. As such CX’s claim against X 
is value given to X and CX is defended under § 550(b)(1). 
As applied to tuition, once D pays it, the school is obliged to educate X, even 
over the subsequent opposition of D. This implies that D made a final and 
irrevocable gift of tuition dollars to X and (as X’s agent) D conveyed X’s dollars 
to the school in payment of tuition. X is thus the initial transferee and the school 
is the transferee of a transferee. 
On this model, suppose the student changes her mind and decides not to go 
to school. Under the policy of reputable schools, a refund of tuition dollars will 
be offered.125 If the refund belongs to X, then it must be the case that D first 
gifted X with the dollars and then (as X’s agent) bought X the education with X’s 
funds. For this reason, X owns the refund. If the refund belongs to D, then it also 
follows that D may prevent X from attending school, thereby generating the 
refund. The school may take the position that, where X wants to continue the 
education, X may attend school over the opposition of D and D is not entitled to 
the refund. This is good evidence that X was the initial transferee of the tuition 
dollars and that the school is a transferee from X—a transferee of a transferee 
entitled to the § 550(b)(1) defense. 
A proof exists to show that X is the initial transferee and the school is the 
remote transferee. The proof comes from voidable preference law and, more 
specifically, from the “earmarking doctrine” that has been developed to defend 
refinancing of debt. 
Very briefly, Bankruptcy Code § 547(b) makes voidable transfers to 
unsecured creditors shortly before bankruptcy. Suppose D owes C1 on an 
unsecured debt. The day before bankruptcy, D wires funds to C1. The trustee 
may avoid this payment, forcing C1 to disgorge.126 C1 may then enter the 
bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor.127 
Suppose, however, D refinances the debt to C1 by borrowing on an unsecured 
basis from C2. D promises to repay C2 and, on the day before bankruptcy, C2 
wires the loan proceeds directly to C1. Courts long ago observed that this 
transaction has no deleterious effect on the size of D’s bankruptcy estate or on 
the equal distribution of the estate to D’s unsecured creditors. In effect, all that 
we observe is that the identity of one of the unsecured creditors has changed. 
 
 125 Pergament, 595 B.R. at 11; Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 70–71 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2019). 
 126 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550(a)(1) (2019). 
 127 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2019). 
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Two days before bankruptcy, C1 was a creditor. On the day of bankruptcy, C1 is 
not a creditor. C2 has taken the place of C1, and the amount available to distribute 
to the unsecured creditors remains unchanged.128 
The way courts describe this result is to say that C1 never received debtor 
property.129 Rather C1 received C2’s property. The reason why the loan proceeds 
are not D’s property is that D never controlled the loan proceeds. The wire went 
directly from C2 to C1. 
The claim is patently absurd. D requested the loan and instructed C2 where 
to send the proceeds. Obviously, D controlled the entire transaction. Nobody 
forced D to refinance. 
So far, earmarking is to the detriment of the universities. Just as C2’s wire to 
C1 was (supposedly) a transfer of C2’s property to C1, so D’s tuition check to the 
university is D’s funds, not X’s funds. 
The proof emanates from the cases in which D uses a secured refinancing to 
retire unsecured debt. Suppose D grants a recorded mortgage to C2 and instructs 
D to wire the loan proceeds to C1. D and C2 have exchanged real estate for 
money. This exchange is not preferential.130 Then D directs C2 to wire loan 
proceeds to C1. C2 does so as agent of D, transferring D’s dollars to C1. This 
tripartite transaction depletes the bankruptcy estate and so C1 is guilty of 
voidable preference. In analyzing these cases, courts simply forget the premises 
of earmarking. In the earmarking cases, C2’s wire to C1 conveyed C2’s property, 
not D’s property.131 In secured refinancing, however, C2 is deemed to convey 
D’s property to C1.132 
The secured refinancing cases prove that universities are not the initial 
transferees of tuition payments. In this latter line of cases, the proceeds of C2’s 
loan are D’s property. We see a wire from C2 to C1, but C1 is not the initial 
transferee of C2’s property. Conceptually, the transaction is triangular. C2 
endows D and it is D (via the agency of C2) that conveys to C1. 
 
 128 Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 97 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 129 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (preamble) (“the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property . . . .”); In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1538 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992); 
Mandross v. Peoples Banking Co. (In re Hartley), 825 F.2d 1067, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 130 Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917). In Dean, the Court struck down the mortgage as a fraudulent 
conveyance, since C2 knew D would soon be bankrupt. In effect, D intended to hinder his other unsecured 
creditors when he granted the mortgage to C2.  
 131 In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 97 F.3d at 28. 
 132 David Gray Carlson & William H. Widen, The Earmarking Defense to Voidable Preference Liability: 
A Reconceptualization, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 595–99 (1999). 
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The tuition cases are similarly triangular. In the tuition cases, we witness a 
check from D go to the university, but the school is not the initial transferee of 
D’s property. Rather, D enriches X, then X pays the school through the agency 
of D.133 
The secured refinancing cases turn on making the C2-to-C1 payment into a 
triangle. These cases prove that the D-to-school cases are also triangular. 
C. Tuition Funded by Loans to the Parent 
Under the Higher Education Act of 1965,134 the Department of Education 
(DOE) will lend funds for tuition to the parents of a student to fund the student’s 
education, but the DOE insists on transferring the loan proceeds directly to the 
university.135 
A few cases have ruled that the university receiving these funds has never 
received debtor property. Consequently, the university is not the recipient of a 
fraudulent transfer from the insolvent parent.136 In Eisenberg v. Pennsylvania 
State University (In re Lewis),137 the court remarked: 
[T]he proceeds from the Parent PLUS loans were never [D’s] property, 
were never in his possession or control, and were never remotely 
available to pay [D’s] creditors. As a result, the [DOE’s] payment of 
the Parent PLUS loan proceeds to Penn State did not diminish [D’s] 
bankruptcy estate and avoidance of these transfers would be improper 
and unwarranted.138 
That the university prevails is consistent with the normative thrust of this Article. 
But the rationale of Lewis is in fact catastrophic. The idea is that D can borrow 
and divert the loan proceeds to X. X has received a gift from insolvent D but is 
immune from fraudulent transfer liability because X took lender money, not D’s 
 
 133 Distressingly few tripartite fraudulent transfer cases are willing to find a triangle from D to X to CX, 
but they do exist. See First Independence Capital Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re First 
Independence Capital Corp.), 181 Fed. Appx. 525, 527–28 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Auto-Pak, Inc., 73 B.R. 52, 55 
(D.D.C. 1987); Meoli v. Huntington Natl. Bank (In re Teleservices Croup, Inc.), 444 B.R. 767, 793–95 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 2011); In re Concord Sr. Housing Foundation, 94 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988). For anti-
triangle cases see Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway (In re Southeast Hotel Props. Ltd. Partnership), 99 F.3d 
151, 156 (4th Cir. 1996); see Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn Mitchell Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 124–28 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994). See also Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. 
 134 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2019). 
 135 § 1087(b).  
 136 See Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro), 586 B.R. 379, 380–81, 387–88 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 2018); Novak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus), 586 B.R. 88, 92– 93 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018). 
 137 See Eisenberg v. Pa. State Univ. (In re Lewis), 574 B.R. 536, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 138 Id. at 539. 
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money. Such a premise not only privileges X, who is enriched because D 
obtained the loan, but it makes the lender absolutely liable for having made the 
loan. D’s incurrence of an obligation, it seems, can be a fraudulent transfer. 
Suitably redacted, Bankruptcy Code § 548(a) provides: 
(1) The trustee may avoid any . . . obligation . . . incurred by the 
debtor, that was . . . incurred on or within 2 years before the date 
of the filing of the petition, if the debtor . . . (B)(i) received less 
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
such . . . obligation; and (ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that 
such . . . obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result 
of such . . . obligation . . . .139 
Suppose the lender is unaware that D was insolvent. One would expect that the 
lender is a good faith purchaser of its claim because it tendered consideration to 
D. According to § 548(c), an “obligee of such [an] . . . obligation . . . may 
enforce any obligation incurred . . . to the extent such . . . obligee gave value to 
the debtor in exchange for such . . . obligation.”140 But if the lender has tendered 
the loan proceeds to X, not to D, then the lender never qualifies for the § 548(c) 
defense. 
In Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro),141 the court ruled 
that the university had not received a fraudulent transfer because it received 
DOE funds, not debtor funds.142 In so ruling, the court imagined that it was 
protecting the integrity of the Higher Education Act: 
A conclusion that the Direct PLUS Loan proceeds are property of the 
debtor for purposes of §§ 544 and 548 and therefore available for 
distribution to a debtor’s creditors would undermine the purposes of 
the HEA and disregard the parent-debtor’s lack of possession and 
control over the Direct PLUS Loan proceeds.143 
In fact, the effect of the ruling was to shift liability from the university back to 
the DOE for sending loan proceeds to a third party instead of to the debtor. 
Worse, the rationale deprives the DOE of a bona fide transferee defense under 
§ 548(c).144 
 
 139 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2019).  
 140 § 548(c) (emphasis added).  
 141 Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro), 586 B.R. 379, 380–81, 387–88 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2018). 
 142 Id. at 386.  
 143 Id.  
 144 The DOE can be compared to the financing lender of a leveraged buyout, where the lender knows that 
the loan proceeds are not to be retained by the borrower but are to be “upstreamed” to the departing shareholders. 
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The concept of “control” as the hallmark of debtor property is borrowed 
from the earmarking doctrine in voidable preference law, described above.145 
D’s lack of control explains why C1 is not preferred when an unsecured 
refinancing C2 advances funds to C1. The concept stems from pre-Code days, 
when the voidable preference statute was poorly written, and courts had to 
cobble together legal fictions to make the statute work.146 The Bankruptcy Code 
adds a “contemporaneous exchange” defense in § 547(c)(1).147 According to this 
defense, if C1 has received debtor funds on antecedent debt and it was intended 
to be contemporaneous with C2 (advancing funds on an unsecured basis), then 
the transfer cannot recover the payment to C1.148 The criterion of control is 
therefore outmoded in the environment of voidable preference law and should 
be retired. It definitely should not be exported to fraudulent transfer law. 
In any case, this rationale that the university never received the debtor’s 
property contradicts the classic holding of Dean v. Davis.149 In Dean, a lender 
(X) lent money to D but sent the cash directly to D’s unsecured creditor, C. The 
Court refers to C as being preferred, and X’s mortgage on D’s property was held 
a fraudulent transfer because the lender knew that D’s use of the loan proceeds 
to pay C was a voidable preference. Thus, the Supreme Court viewed the loan 
proceeds (forwarded to C) as D’s property, since it recognized that C had been 
preferred.150 A preference to C implies C received debtor property, not lender 
property. 
Similarly, when a parent D borrows from the DOE and the DOE sends funds 
directly to the university, the university is receiving D’s property. The DOE is 
lending to D and, as agent of D, forwards the proceeds to the university. When 
D borrows cash from the DOE, D is exchanging a promise to repay. D “controls” 
the transaction because D voluntarily promises to repay. The promise enriches 
the university when the DOE wires the funds directly to the university. 
Effectively, the DOE puts D into funds and D then puts the university into the 
 
Ralph Brubaker, On Constructively Fraudulent Transfers and Good Faith Transferees: The Case of a Debtor-
Parent’s Payment of an Adult Child’s College Tuition, 39 Bankr. L. Letter 1, 11–12 (May 2019). 
 145 See id. at 11. 
 146 Carlson & Widen, supra note 132, at 607–12. 
 147 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2019).  
 148 Carlson & Widen, supra note 132, at 592. 
 149 See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443–45 (1917). 
 150 According to Justice Brandeis: “The mortgage was not voidable as a preference under § 60b. Preference 
implies paying or securing a preexisting debt of the person preferred. The mortgage was given to secure Dean 
for a substantially contemporary advance. The bank, not Dean, was preferred. The use of Dean’s money to 
accomplish this purpose could not convert the transaction into a preferring of Dean . . . . Mere circuity of 
arrangement will not save a transfer which effects a preference from being invalid as such.” Id. at 443. 
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same funds. That the DOE requires that the loan proceeds be remitted directly 
to the university does not change the fact that D opted to borrow without 
receiving the loan proceeds. The loan, obviously, dilutes the debtor’s estate 
thereby harming each unsecured creditor of D on a pro rata basis. 
The university should not be liable for receiving the DOE loan, but for the 
reason that it is not the initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer. Rather, D 
borrowed from the DOE to benefit X, the adult child. As agent of D and of X, 
the DOE conveys X’s property to the university. D first makes the gift of loan 
proceeds to X and then (as X’s agent) arranges for the DOE to pay the tuition 
bill. On this preferred analysis, the university obtains the good faith transferee 
defense in Bankruptcy Code § 551(b)(1). 
III. MERE CONDUIT 
In the Brooklyn Law School case, the court, Solomon-style, ruled that 
sometimes the school is liable and sometimes it is not. But the criterion for 
distinguishing liability from non-liability is arbitrary. This arbitrariness stems 
from the invocation of the legal fiction of mere conduit. 
“Conduit” was a phrase Justice Cardozo once used. In Carson v. Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York,151 a bank wrote checks to the Federal Reserve Bank 
(FRB), which was a collecting agent for other banks with whom checks had been 
deposited.152 The checks bounced and the FRB demanded that the drawer bank 
pay the amounts of the dishonored checks. The drawer bank did so and soon 
filed for bankruptcy. Since the FRB was acting for other entities, the FRB was 
acquitted of voidable preference. Judge Cardozo said, “The person to be charged 
with liability, if he has parted before the bankruptcy with title and possession, 
must have been more than a mere custodian, an intermediary or conduit between 
the bankrupt and the creditor.”153 
In modern times, Bonded Financial Services v. European American Bank154 
is considered the seminal case of “mere conduit.”155 Bonded is a case rife with 
unacknowledged contradiction.156 Much simplified, the case involves D 
instructing its bank to debit D’s account and to credit X’s account with the same 
 
 151 Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 N.E. 475 (N.Y. 1930). 
 152 Id. at 476.  
 153 Id. at 482 (emphasis added). 
 154 Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 155 Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 156 This is documented in Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. 
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bank.157 Properly, the bank was neither a transferee nor a transferor.158 At one 
moment the bank owed D. Following D’s order, the bank owed X. The bank’s 
duty to pay was the thing transferred.159 There were no bank deposits of new 
funds in the case.160 
Nevertheless, Judge Frank Easterbrook confused matters by proclaiming 
that the bank was a transferee that was not a transferee.161 Rather, the bank was 
a conduit. Judge Easterbrook read § 550(a)(1) as excluding mere conduits from 
being transferees.162 
In the course of unnecessarily visiting the definition of “transferee,” Judge 
Easterbrook offered a hypothetical under which bank would be a transferee—
and an initial transferee to boot. According to Judge Easterbrook: 
If the note accompanying [D’s] check had said: “use this check to 
reduce [X’s] loan” instead of “deposit this check into [X’s] account, 
§ 550(a)(1) would provide a ready answer. The Bank would be the 
“initial transferee” and [X] would be the “entity for whose benefit [the] 
transfer was made.”163 
This is tantamount to the following claim: X owes CX. D, wishing to enrich X, 
tenders the money to CX, who accepts it in discharge of CX’s claim against X. 
Supposedly, CX is the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer. X is the person 
benefited.164 That is, X is no transferee at all and is a “person benefited” under 
§ 550(a)(1). The trustee has the option to pursue CX or X under § 550(a)(1). 
Neither is entitled to the good faith transferee defense of § 550(b)(1). Judge 
Easterbrook’s unfortunate hypothetical completely overlooks the phenomenon 
of subrogation, whereby the bank sells to D the bank’s valuable rights against X. 
That is, when D pays the bank, X’s obligation to the bank does not disappear. 
The bank sells its rights to D; D receives reasonably equivalent value whenever 
X is solvent at the time D conveys funds to the bank.165 Separately, debt 
forgiveness is independently a fraudulent transfer. This transfer travels from D 
directly to X.166 
 
 157 See Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 890. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 892. 
 164 See Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936, 937–41 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 165 See Grochocinsky v. Reliant Interactive Media Corp. (In re General Search.com), 322 B.R. 836, 842– 
43 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 166 See supra text accompanying notes 116–20. 
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Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical has been read as establishing the following 
proposition: If a transferee (CX) is a creditor of X, CX is an initial transferee. But 
if CX receives an advance payment, expecting to be a creditor later, CX is not a 
transferee, even if CX used the advance payment for its own purposes. Rather, in 
receiving the advance payment and owing a refund to X, CX was a mere conduit, 
not a transferee. Later, when CX’s contingent claim becomes vested, CX (not a 
transferee) becomes a transferee of a transferee. As such, CX is entitled to assert 
that CX in good faith accepted the payment in satisfaction of X’s debt, 
entitling CX to the bona fide transferee defense of § 550(b)(1). 
The purest example of this theory at work is Menotte v. United States (In re 
Custom Contractors, LLC)167, where CX (the IRS) was held to be a mere conduit. 
X, an insider, had caused D Corp. to pay X’s estimated taxes by sending a check 
directly to the IRS.168 X ended up having no income, so the IRS refunded the 
entire payment to X. X did not remit the refund to D Corp., as he should have 
done. D Corp. was soon bankrupt. 
D’s bankruptcy trustee sued the IRS as the initial transferee of a fraudulent 
transfer.169 The court ruled, however, that the IRS was a mere conduit. The IRS 
was the “initial recipient”170 of a transfer but it was not the initial transferee. 
According to the Custom court, when D conveys to CX in discharge of X’s 
obligation to CX, CX is an initial transferee, contrary to what has been argued 
here. “Implicit in these cases is the principle that funds received as payment of 
a debt leave the recipient with no obligations; that is, the transferee receives them 
with no strings attached.”171 
But where, as a result of D’s transfer, CX owes repayment to X, CX has no 
control over the transferred property, even though CX is free to use D’s dollars 
for its own purposes. When CX is a bank receiving funds from D for the benefit 
of X, CX is a mere conduit: 
Our case law, then, stands for the proposition that, when a bank 
receives funds in the form of a deposit, the attendant obligations owed 
to the transferor [sic]—namely to return the funds upon request—are 
 
 167 Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 745 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 168 D Corp. listed these payments to the IRS as distributions to X. Id. at 1345. 
 169 Actually, X was probably an embezzler. If so, this was no fraudulent transfer case, and the court had 
no need to ascertain the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1). A fraudulent transfer is a conveyance of legal 
and equitable title. An embezzlement at best leaves equitable title in the victim. See Carlson, Mere Conduit, 
supra note 14, at 485–491. 
 170 In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 745 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 171 Id. at 1350. 
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sufficiently important that we will not hold the bank liable as an initial 
transferee in spite of the significant control it exercises over the 
funds.172 
Significantly, this account contains a Freudian slip. When D makes an advance 
payment to CX (a bank), CX owes a refund to the transferor. That would be X. 
So, D conveyed to X as initial transferee (not to CX). X made an advance payment 
to CX, and when CX’s contingent claim against X becomes vested, C expropriates 
X’s property. X was the transferor and hence must have been the initial transferee 
of D. 
Let us visit Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical more slowly. D (wishing to 
enrich X) deposits money with CX in expectation CX will perform a service for 
X’s benefit. So far, CX is not a transferee. Yet D has alienated the money. 
Somebody must be the transferee. That person must be X. 
On the other hand, suppose the payment is not in advance of the vesting of 
CX’s claim. That is to say, X owes CX at the time of the debt. D gives funds to 
CX. On Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical, CX is the initial transferee.173 
This makes no sense. In the case of the advance payment, where CX is not 
obliged to segregate the funds, CX has dominion and control over what CX 
received from D. In Judge Easterbrook’s colorful phrase, CX is free to buy 
“lottery tickets or uranium stocks.”174 Yet these are the same facts when CX has 
a vested claim against X. In both cases, CX is a transferee with dominion and 
control over the advance payment. Whether CX is obligated to X does not change 
this fact.175 
As applied to fraudulent tuition, the schools in the Brooklyn case required 
advance payment and offered refunds in case of cancellation. According to the 
Brooklyn court, schools in this posture are not initial transferees.176 Since D has 
made a transfer and since the school is not the transferee, X was the one and only 
 
 172 Id. 
 173 See Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank., 838 F.2d 890, 891–92 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 174 Id. at 894. 
 175 To make matters worse, the bank in Bonded did not even have a duty to honor X’s withdrawals. The 
bank had lent money to X and had a right of setoff against X. In short, the bank had control over X’s deposit 
account and, on Judge Easterbrook’s control criteria, the bank should have been the initial transferee of D’s 
deposit on behalf of X. Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d 
716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017) (“As our sister circuits have explained, the account-holder’s right to withdraw the 
deposits keeps the bank from obtaining dominion and control.”). Yet there were no bank deposits in Bonded. 
So, the bank was not a transferee at all! 
 176 Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 10–11 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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transferee.177 Later, when the school earns the advance payment, the school is 
transferee of a transferee. If the school does not know that the parent D is 
insolvent, the education bestowed on X is value defending the school under 
§ 550(b)(1).178 
But when tuition is not paid in advance, the school is the initial transferee.179 
And X, by implication, would seem to be a person benefited within the meaning 
of Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1). The trustee thus has the option of pursuing the 
school or X for recovery of the fraudulent transfer. 
Where the student X is the initial transferee, is not the school also “the entity 
for whose benefit [the] transfer was made[,]” within the meaning of 
§ 550(a)(1)?180 If so, the school is deprived all the same of the bona fide 
transferee defense, which is available to transferees of transferees.181 
This conclusion violates a major holding in Bonded. It will be recalled that, 
in Bonded, D ordered a bank to debit D’s deposit account and credit X’s deposit 
account, thereby enriching X. It so happened that X also owed the bank on a 
secured loan. Six weeks after, X used the deposit account to pay down the bank 
loan.182 The Bonded court viewed the bank as a transferee of a transferee in good 
faith. As such, the court held the bank was entitled to the good faith transferee 
defense of § 550(b)(1).183 This much is not controverted. 
The bankruptcy trustee in Bonded countered that, although the bank may 
have been the transferee of a transferee, the bank also benefited by the deposit, 
because the “deposit” was eventually used to pay the bank.184 As a person 
benefited under § 550(a)(1), the bank was not eligible for the good faith 
transferee defense of § 550(b)(1). Sensibly, Judge Easterbrook responded that, 
once labeled a transferee of a transferee, D Bank was constitutively incapable of 
being an entity for whose benefit the initial transfer was made. Any other 
conclusion would deny to a transferee of a transferee the § 550(b) good faith 
defense: “The structure of the statute separates initial transferees and 
beneficiaries, on the one hand, from ‘immediate or mediate transferee[s],’ on the 
 
 177 Id. at 9. 
 178 20 U.S.C. § 151 (2019). 
 179 Pergament, 595 B.R. at 18. 
 180 Id. at 7; see 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2019). 
 181 See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (making the defense available to entities described in subsection (a)(2). 
 182 See Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 183 Id. at 897–98. 
 184 Id. at 891. The trustee’s position is compromised by the fact that there was no deposit in Bonded. The 
transfer was accomplished by an “on us” check issued by D for the benefit of X. See supra text accompanying 
notes 152–58. 
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other. The implication is that the ‘entity for whose benefit’ is different from a 
transferee, ‘immediate’ or otherwise.”185 This is sound statutory interpretation, 
though one must admit that every transferee of a transferee is benefited by the 
initial transfer. 
To be noted is that Judge Easterbrook read § 550(a)(1) in a way to assure 
that a transferee of a transferee receives access to the good faith transfer defense. 
Why then can we not read § 550(a)(1) in such a way as to provide Brooklyn Law 
School with a good faith transfer defense? We have seen that such a triangle is 
drawn to solve an important subset of voidable preference cases. Such a triangle 
should be conjured in fraudulent tuition cases, in order to assure that universities 
obtain the bona fide transfer defense.186 
I end this section with a suggestion that demonstrates the perversity of the 
Brooklyn case. The court relied heavily on the fact that the student owned the 
refund if the student decided to cancel prior to registration day. Because of this 
supposed fact, Brooklyn Law School was potentially a transferee of a transferee 
entitled to the bona fide transfer defense in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1). The 
decision includes this footnote: “The trustee’s subsequent assertion that ‘the 
Debtor limited his children’s right to use the Tuition Payments for any purpose 
other than paying tuition’ . . . is conclusory and unsupported by the record.”187 
What if a trustee can prove that the adult child X agreed that if X canceled school 
X held the refund in trust for D? It is rather hard to say, prior to registration day, 
that X has received a fraudulent transfer. At best, X has received legal title to a 
contingent refund held in trust for D. In that case, the school has received tuition 
dollars with the obligation to return them in case of school cancellation. This is 
no fraudulent transfer either, since D receives a reasonably equivalent value 
from the school when it transfers refundable dollars to the school. Now suppose 
the semester begins. The tuition is no longer refundable. It seems to me that the 
school is the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer, in spite of the advance 
payment of tuition. Before the semester begins, D has an equitable right to a 
refund. After the semester begins, D gives up this right and the university is 
enriched. If this is correct, then school liability turns entirely on the agreement 
 
 185 Id. at 895. 
 186 Courts in tripartite fraudulent transfer cases like to “collapse” triangles in order to make the case 
bipartite and easy to solve, as the bona fide purchaser defense of value-paying defendants is eliminated. See 
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d Cir. 1986); CNB Int’l, Inc. Litig. Tr. v. 
Lloyds TSB Bank plc (In re CNB Int’l, Inc.), 440 B.R. 31, 42–45 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). What I propose here is the 
opposite. A straight line is to be made triangular. In mathematics, this is known as a “lifting” homomorphism in 
a short exact sequence of ring modules—a straight line between two objects is made into a triangle between 
three objects. DAVID S. DUMMIT & RICHARD M. FOOTE, ABSTRACT ALGEBRA 385–88 (3d ed. 2003). 
 187 Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 14, n. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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between parent and child with regard to the refund. It is very difficult for school 
administrators to guard against this possibility. Insisting on advance payment 
would not suffice to ward off liability. All this nonsense is eliminated if it is 
agreed that the student is always the initial transferee of fraudulent tuition. In 
such a case the school is transferee of a transferee and entitled to the defense 
accorded to bona fide transfers in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1). 
IV. THE LIABILITY OF STUDENTS 
Among the courts that have considered the matter, a majority holds that the 
tuition-paying insolvent parent receives no reasonably equivalent value when an 
adult child is educated. On this assumption, there is a fraudulent transfer, but 
who is liable? I have suggested that a good faith school is never liable because 
it is always a transferee of a transferee with the § 550(b)(1) defense. It therefore 
follows that the adult child is liable as the initial transferee.188 
Since X dissipates the contractual right to an education by actually being 
educated, there are no longer any tangible proceeds of tuition that can be turned 
over to the bankruptcy trustee. Education is a “wasting asset.”189 Therefore, the 
trustee can expect a money judgment to be issued against X. According to 
Bankruptcy Code § 550(a), in the case of a fraudulent transfer, “the trustee may 
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so 
orders, the value of such property” from the initial transferee.190 If X is like most 
recent graduates, a six-figure judgment for the value of the education renders X 
insolvent. 
X’s liability for tuition will likely bankrupt X. May X escape this judgment 
by seeking discharge in bankruptcy? Unhappily, X may find that X’s obligation 
to D is not dischargeable for two reasons; first, the Supreme Court may have 
held that judgments for receipt of a fraudulent transfer are not dischargeable.191 
 
 188 But see Lo v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1072–75 (2018). The court seems to be disagreeing. In that 
case, the California Court of Appeal accepted a lower court determination that the parent D received reasonably 
equivalent value when child X was educated. That should have ended the matter. If there was no fraudulent 
transfer, X is off the hook. Unnecessarily the court held X was not a “person benefited” under California law: 
the benefits of an education are not quantifiable. Therefore, X had no liability. It may be protested that X’s 
contract with the university was proceeds of the tuition payment. If tuition was a fraudulent transfer, then the 
education contract was the proceeds. Thus, even if X did not benefit from being educated, X was a transferee of 
a transferee and potentially liable, if indeed the tuition payment was fraudulent. 
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
 190 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis added). 
 191 Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (2016). For detailed analysis, see David Gray 
Carlson, The Supreme Court, Dischargeability, and Actual Fraud, 27 Am Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (2020) 
(forthcoming). 
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Second, the student has received an educational benefit (tuition) that must be 
repaid. That makes the fraudulent transfer a student loan. Student loans are not 
dischargeable, unless repaying it causes an undue hardship to the student.192 
A. Receipt of a Fraudulent Transfer 
Bankruptcy practitioners know that giving a conveyance intended to hinder 
creditors prevents any discharge for D in bankruptcy.193 Less well-known is that 
receipt of a fraudulent transfer arguably gives rise to a nondischargeable 
obligation under §523(a)(2) with respect to “property . . . obtained by . . . actual 
fraud . . . .” This is so under one reading of the Supreme Court’s perplexing 
decision in Husky International Electronics v. Ritz.194 
In Ritz, D Corp owed CD for goods sold on unsecured credit. No one made 
a misrepresentation regarding this credit sale.195 So far, we have a breach of 
contract claim—archetypically dischargeable. 
On the eve of D Corp.’s collapse, X (the controlling shareholder of D Corp.) 
arranged a transfer of D Corp. funds to another corporation (X Corp.) of which 
X was also a shareholder.196 Later, X filed for bankruptcy. 
At first glance, it would seem that X was no transferee of D Corp. property. 
Rather, X Corp was. But Texas law invites imposing liability on shareholders of 
a corporation if that individual “caused the corporation to be used for the purpose 
of perpetrating . . . an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct 
personal benefit of the holder . . . .”197 
CD sought to impose liability on X under this statute. CD, however, was most 
vague on whether CD was seeking to pierce the veil of D Corp. or the veil of X 
Corp. If CD was seeking to pierce the D Corp. veil, CD’s theory against X was 
breach of a sales agreement between D Corp. and CD.198 Such claims are 
dischargeable, provided no misrepresentations were made in getting CD to 
extend unsecured credit. 
 
 192 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019). 
 193 See § 727(a)(2). 
 194 See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1589. 
 195 See id. at 1589–90. 
 196 X Corp. is a composite of seven different subsidiaries in which X owned some or all the shares. See In 
re Ritz, 832 F.3d 560, 563, n.1 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 197 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2007). 
 198 See In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 632 (“Unquestionably, the debt that [C] owed to it is based on D Corp.s 
breach of contract”). See also Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1591–92 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (assuming 
C’s theory against X was for breach of a sales contract). 
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If CD was seeking to pierce the X Corp. veil, then CD’s theory was that, as a 
creditor of D Corp., CD could reach the property D Corp. fraudulently 
transferred to X Corp. If, thanks to veil-piercing, X was the same person as X 
Corp., CD could have judgment against X for receiving a fraudulent transfer. But, 
by virtue of D Corp.’s bankruptcy proceeding, such a cause of action did not 
belong to CD. Rather, it belonged to D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee. CD had no 
business pursuing this cause of action and was indeed in violation of the 
automatic stay arising in the D Corp. bankruptcy for doing so—a fact that the 
Supreme Court would overlook. 
To further confuse the picture, X was an embezzling insider of D Corp. This 
means that we are not facing a fraudulent transfer case at all! Rather, we are 
looking at a case of stolen funds.199 “A thief cannot pass good title.”200 A 
fraudulent transfer implies the transfer of title from D Corp. to X Corp.201 
Whether we have a voluntary transfer by D Corp. turns on whether X was within 
the scope of his authority as D Corp.’s agent when X transferred D Corp. funds 
to X Corp. Typically, transfers out of the ordinary course of business must be 
approved by the board of directors of a corporation.202 There is no evidence in 
any of the reported opinions that such authority existed. 
If I am right that X was an embezzler and D Corp. was the victim of a theft, 
then X Corp. is obligated to reimburse D Corp. for conversion or on a 
restitutionary theory of unjust enrichment. X (the thief) is also obligated to return 
the stolen funds. This obligation is itself nondischargeable,203 but it is not a cause 
of action that belongs to CD. Rather, D Corp. owns this cause of action, and since 
D Corp. was bankrupt, the cause of action is part of D Corp.’s bankruptcy estate. 
We shall, however, waive this point and treat X’s embezzlement as D Corp.’s 
fraudulent transfer to X Corp. But the price of this waiver is that we must 
 
 199 See Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14, at 485–491. 
 200 Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 201 The Supreme Court, incidentally, identifies X, as the transferor of a fraudulent transfer, not a thief (or 
transferee) of funds. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (“courts and legislature have used the term 
‘fraud’ to describe a debtor’s transfer of assets that, like Ritz’s scheme, impairs a creditor’s ability to collect the 
debt.”). 
 202 See Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. 
 203 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2019) (preventing discharge of a claim arising from “fraud or defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny”). C had sought to bar X’s liability for its breach of 
contract claim on this ground. The bankruptcy court dismissed this claim on the general proposition that X, as 
officer of D Corp., owed not fiduciary duty to the creditors of D Corp. Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 
459 B.R. 623, 633–34 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). The bankruptcy court also ruled that X could not be denied a 
discharge under § 523(a)(6) (“willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property to 
another entity”). Whereas X did embezzle from D Corp., X did not injure any property of C. Id. at 635. 
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consider that X was acting in the proper scope of his authority when he caused 
D Corp. to transfer funds to X Corp. for no fair consideration. The presence of a 
fraudulent transfer means that X is to be acquitted of the charge of 
embezzlement. 
Initially, the bankruptcy court in Ritz ruled that X was not liable for D Corp.’s 
breach of contract claim to CD.204 And even if such a debt did exist, the court 
opined, it would be dischargeable. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), thought the 
bankruptcy court, requires a misrepresentation of fact by X, and X made no 
misrepresentations.205 X simply embezzled funds from D Corp. on behalf of X 
Corp. 
CD appealed from the bankruptcy court’s decision that denied X’s liability to 
CD. The district court affirmed. The district court did find, however, that X could 
be liable for the breach of contract if X made a fraudulent transfer. That is to say, 
the district court viewed X as the transferor, not the transferee.206 It must have 
been the case, however, that the district court pierced the X Corp. veil and 
confounded this with piercing the D Corp. veil.207 
The district court nevertheless affirmed the bankruptcy court. The fraudulent 
transfer to X Corp. was not a misrepresentation to CD to induce CD to extend 
unsecured credit to D Corp. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
along the same lines.208 
 
 204 Id. at 632–33. 
 205 Id. at 635. 
 206 Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 513 B.R. 510, 537 (S.D. Tex. 2014). (“He drained [D Corp.] of 
funds and fraudulently transferred those funds to other entities under his control and/or ownership . . . .”) 
(alteration added). 
 207 In support of the conclusion is the fact that the district court relied on Spring St. Partners IV, L.P. v, 
Lam, 730 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2013), which had been handed down after the bankruptcy court’s opinion in Ritz. 
In Lam, D conveyed a valuable thing to X Corp., of which X was shareholder. D then filed for bankruptcy. CD 
then sued X because X Corp. received a fraudulent transfer. The court of appeals upheld a judgment against X. 
for the fraudulent transfer received by X Corp. The district court’s reliance on Lam leads to the view that the X 
Corp. veil was the one being pierced. On remand, the bankruptcy court emphasized that X was the recipient of 
D Corp.’s fraudulent transfer. This assumes piercing the X Corp. veil. Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 567 
B.R. 715, 761– 62 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 208 See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 316–21 (5th Cir. 2015). 
CARLSONPROOFS_6.8.20 6/8/2020 11:45 AM 
54 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
By the time the Supreme Court took the case, no court had actually held that 
X was liable on CD’s claim.209 The Supreme Court assumed that X had already 
been held liable to CX210—but for what? 
A plausible reading of Ritz is that X was liable because X Corp. had received 
a fraudulent transfer from D Corp. (That is, the Supreme Court had assumed that 
the X Corp. veil had been pierced to establish X’s liability). This reading is 
consistent with the following passage from Ritz: “[T]he recipient of a 
transfer—who, with the requisite intent, also commits fraud—can ‘obtai[n]’ 
assets ‘by’ his or her participation in the fraud. If that recipient later files for 
bankruptcy, any debts ‘traceable to’ the fraudulent conveyance will be 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).”211 Such a reading of Ritz is bad news 
for students. Ritz may mean that a money judgment against a fraudulent transfer 
recipient is not dischargeable in bankruptcy when parent D intended to hinder 
creditors. 
Students, however, may be able to distinguish Ritz on the facts. In Ritz, X 
was an active participant in the fraud. X was the controlling shareholder of D 
Corp., who caused D Corp. to issue checks to X Corp. Students may be less 
blameworthy; they may be passive recipients of fraudulent tuition. Therefore, 
money judgments for passive receipt of a fraudulent transfer may still be 
dischargeable in spite of Ritz. 
Students are certainly capable of conspiring with their parents with regard to 
tuition payments. That is undoubtedly a finding of fact. Nondischargeability 
certainly follows if the student knows the parent is insolvent at the time the 
tuition is paid. If the theory in tuition cases, however, is constructive fraudulent 
transfer, then a tuition case differs from that of Ritz. The theory in Ritz was actual 
fraudulent transfer (though there was also an overlapping constructive 
fraudulent transfer theory). And the words in Bankruptcy Code § 523(a) are 
actual fraud (not constructive fraud).212 
 
 209 Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2016) (“The District court held that 
Ritz was personally liable for the debt under Texas law . . . .”) with Husky Int’l Elecs. Inc., v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 
832 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2016) (on remand, “[w]e are . . . required to consider the issue that we pretermitted 
on [C’s] appeal to this court: whether [X] owes a debt to [C] under Texas law. We do so because if [X] is not 
liable to [C] under Texas law, then there is no debt to discharge and the question of the deniability of a discharge 
under § 523(a)(2)(A) is moot”). 
 210 “The district court held that [X] was personally liable for the debt under Texas law.” See Husky Int’l 
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1585. 
 211 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 212 According to Justice Sotomayor: 
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Prior to Ritz, the leading case on receipt of fraudulent transfers was 
McClellan v. Cantrell.213 Here, the court distinguishes sharply between 
constructive and actual fraudulent transfers: 
The fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy does 
not reach constructive frauds, only actual ones . . . . To transfer 
property for less than adequate consideration may be desperate, 
foolish, or imprudent, and the receipt of such a transfer a pure windfall, 
but neither the transfer nor the receipt is in and of itself dishonest, and 
so neither is an appropriate ground for refusing to allow the debtor to 
discharge the debt arising from the transfer and thus to get on with his 
life without the debt hanging over his head.214 
Courts may use this ploy to limit the consequences of Ritz on behalf of 
students. But the ploy depends on the finding that the parent was not guilty of 
an actual fraud when the parent wrote the tuition check.215 If the check was 
written against the background of obvious insolvency, then the parent can be 
found to have the bad intent. After all, it is part of the black-letter definition of 
intent that an actor intends the result he knows is certain to occur.216 Indeed, 
insolvency at the time of transfer is a “badge of fraud”—evidence of actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud.217 Many constructive fraudulent transfers are also 
actual fraudulent transfers.218 
 
Actual fraud” has two parts: actual and fraud. The word “actual” has a simple meaning in the 
context of common-law fraud: It denotes any fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or intentional 
wrong. “Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud “in law,” which describe acts 
of deception that “may exist without imputation of ad faith or immorality.” Thus, anything that 
counts as “fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud. 
Id. at 1586 (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878) (alteration added). 
 213 McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893–95 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 214 Id. at 894. McCllellan would not seem to be a real fraudulent transfer case. A fraudulent transfer 
requires a transfer of debtor property with intent to hinder, etc. McClellan involved the transfer of a machine 
encumbered by an unperfected security interest. The conveyance of D’s equity to X was arguably honest and 
appropriate. See U.C.C. § 9-401(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“whether a debtor’s rights in 
collateral may be voluntarily . . . transferred is governed by law other than this article.”). The wrong in the case 
was when X sold the machine to a bona fide purchaser who took free and clear of the security interest, and when 
X converted the Article 9 proceeds to her own use. See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2010). Properly, X’s debt for conversion was nondischargeable Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6). 
 215 Derek Huish reports that allegations of actual fraud exist in 27% of the cases as of 2019. See Derek A. 
Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking to Ancient and Recent History to Define 
the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2159, 2189 (2019). 
 216 Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 504 (Ohio 1988) (defining an intentional tort 
as “an act committed . . . with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur”). 
 217 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b)(9) (“In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), 
consideration may be given, among other factors to where . . . (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent 
shortly after the transfer was made . . . .”). 
 218 Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 357. 
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Thus, the student obtains a discharge if the parent has no intent to hinder 
creditors or, if such intent exists, the student had no knowledge of this intent.219 
B. The Fraudulent Transfer as a Type of Student Loan 
Even if Ritz is not an obstacle to dischargeability, another problem impedes 
the student’s discharge. The fraudulent transfer to X (the student) qualifies as a 
student loan. Under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8) student loans are not 
dischargeable “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents . . . . ”220 
Student loans are accorded much definition in Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(8). 
One of the definitions applies to receipt of a fraudulent education. According to 
§ 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), a general discharge does not operate on “an obligation to 
repay funds received as an educational benefit . . . .” The student X, ex hypothesi, 
is the initial transferee of tuition from insolvent parent D. Fraudulent transfer 
law requires X to repay these funds to D’s bankruptcy trustee. Thus, unless X 
can show undue hardship, X has still received an educational benefit that, 
according to fraudulent transfer theory, must be repaid. Thus, the fraudulent 
transfer constitutes a nondischargeable student loan. 
C. The Student’s Obligation to Reimburse a School Held Liable for 
Fraudulent Tuition 
The first two subsections cover the case where the school is accorded a bona 
fide transferee defense because it is the transferee of a transferee and X is the 
initial transferee of the tuition gift. Suppose, contrary to what has been argued 
here, the school has to pay as initial transferee. If the school is liable, then X 
must pay all the same. Because the school’s contract is with the student and 
because the payment has been avoided, the school may sue X for the tuition. 
 
 219 See Sauer Inc v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2443 (2016):  
[T]he debtor-transferee must herself be “guilty of intent to defraud” and not merely be the passive 
recipient of a fraudulent conveyance. Such intent may be inferred from her acceptance of a 
transfer that she knew was made for the purpose of hindering the transferor’s creditor(s), but it 
may not be implied as a matter of law. 
 220 On what constitutes an undue hardship, see generally Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It’s 
Free!: The Evolution of Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Hedlund v. 
Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 Am. Bankr. L.J. 65, 74–94 (2015); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, 
Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 405 (2005). 
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Because they may be avoided as preferences or as fraudulent transfers, 
payments in general can never be considered final. An example is Security First 
National Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee).221 In this case, a law firm guaranteed 
a bank loan to the client. The firm paid the bank slightly before bankruptcy, 
using the client’s settlement that the firm has received from a personal injury 
defendant. The firm’s guaranty was seemingly satisfied and discharged. But 
when the client’s bankruptcy trustee recovered the bank’s payment as a voidable 
preference, the law firm’s obligation under the guaranty revived. The bank’s 
payment turned out to have been conditional, and its avoidance put the parties 
in status quo ante. 
Thus, if there really is a fraudulent transfer in the picture, it is X, now well-
educated and with an advanced degree from the School of Hard Knocks, that 
pays the tuition bill. Either X has a nondischargeable liability to the bankruptcy 
trustee of her parents, or the university may sue X for ultimately failing to pay 
tuition—a claim that is also not dischargeable (in the absense of undue 
hardship). 
CONCLUSION 
Tuition payments to universities by insolvent parents on behalf of their adult 
children may be fraudulent transfers. This depends on whether the parent 
received reasonably equivalent value when an adult child received the golden 
gift of education. Courts are split on this question, and on this point I am 
agnostic. But I have also shown that universities are not the initial transferees of 
fraudulent tuition. Rather, the student is the initial transferee. The school 
receives student dollars even when the parent cuts a check directly to the 
university. If this is recognized, the nightmare of “mere conduit” analysis can be 
discarded as an unnecessary fiction. Universities that educate in good faith are 
never liable because an insolvent parent wrote a tuition check directly to a 
university. 
 
 221 See In re Coutee, 984 F.2d 138, 140–41 (5th Cir. 1993). 
